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The Eleventh Circuit's Rendezvous
with Section 1782*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the 2020 election draws near, the United States' divide on matters
of foreign relations is more polarized than it has been in decades.
Therefore, case law interpreting statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 17821—
which provides an avenue to aid litigation in foreign countries—is
increasingly relevant in today's society. Section 1782 proceedings do not
usually make the front page of the news, and most attorneys can practice
their entire career without ever coming across the statute at all,
nevertheless, Section 1782 is an important part of foreign litigation and
international relations and has been for over 150 years.
Section 1782 proceedings have become more relevant throughout the
United States, and at this point, every circuit, and most district courts
have dealt with numerous cases invoking a Section 1782 application. The
statute allows parties of foreign litigation to file an application
requesting the help of the United States in providing domestic discovery
materials to litigation happening outside of the United States. In doing
so, Congress hoped to provide an efficient avenue to aid foreign litigants
as well as show other countries that the United States cooperates with
foreign proceedings with the hope that other countries will do the same. 2
Section 1782 has statutory requirements that an applicant must meet
in order for their application for discovery aid to be granted. 3 The power
to grant or deny the application has been given to the district courts.4 In
addition to the statutory requirements, the courts have developed
discretionary factors to consider in light of the statute's purpose. 5

*Thank you to Professor Tim Floyd who has guided me since the start of my law school
career and who has advised me on this Casenote. Also, to David and Catherine Larkin, my
parents, words do not do justice for how thankful I am for you both.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2019).
2. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 252 (2004).
3. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 1331.
5. Intel Corp., 542 U.S at 264–65.
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Through the decision of Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc.,6 the Supreme Court of the United States expressly stated the factors
that must be considered and while presumably helpful, it also opened the
door to critical questions.7
This year, in 2019, the case of Dep't of Caldas v. Diageo PLC8
presented two of such issues to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit as a matter of first impression. 9 The issue of who
bears the burden of proof as to the discretionary factors is one of these
questions, and while other circuit courts have ruled on this issue, the
Eleventh Circuit has not. The Eleventh Circuit also decided an issue of
first impression, for not only this circuit but the other circuits as well,
when it held that granting a partial Section 1782 application is allowed
even when an applicant filed jointly with other applicants who may not
meet the statutory requirements.10
In deciding these issues of first impression in Dep't of Caldas, the court
used a rational and balanced approach and ultimately set the stage for a
common-sense interpretation of the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1782.11
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To provide context, the Republic of Colombia is divided into thirty-two
territories which are referred to as Departments. 12 In 2016, four of those
Colombian Departments prepared to sue two liquor companies in the
Republic of Colombia for unfair competition.13 The unfair competition
claim centered around alleged smuggling of the liquor company products
into Colombia.14
In June of 2016, the Colombian Departments, in light of the
anticipated litigation of a foreign proceeding, filed a joint application to
obtain discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The four Departments—Caldas,
Cundinamarca, Valle del Cauca, and Antioquia—sought to depose five
previous employees of the liquor companies of Diageo PLC, Seagrams

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 925 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2019).
9. Id. at 1221.
10. Id. at 1224.
11. Id. at 1223–24.
12. Information
About
Departments
of
Colombia,
COLOMBIAINFO.ORG,
https://www.colombiainfo.org/en-us/colombia/departments.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
13. In re Dep'ts of Antioquia, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179442, *1, *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Oct.
27, 2017).
14. Brief of Intervenors–Appellants Liquor Companies at *3, In re Application of Dep't
of Antioquia v. Diageo PLC, 2018 WL 446300, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 8, 2018).
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Sales Co. Ltd., and Pernod-Ricard S.A. The five previous employees were
non-party witnesses to the case. The liquor companies filed an opposition
to the Section 1782 application.15
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
referred the application to the magistrate court which issued a report
recommending the denial of the Departments' application. 16 The
magistrate's reasoning was based primarily on the fact that although two
of the four Departments—Valle del Cauca and Cundinamarca—satisfied
the statutory requirements, granting the application for those two
Departments would basically grant it to all four Departments. The
magistrate judge recommended that because all four Departments would
benefit from the discovery—even though only two Departments satisfied
the statutory requirements—the discretionary factor weighing whether
the discovery request circumvents the statute's purpose would be
violated too strongly.17
The magistrate court also decided that the second factor, the
receptivity of the foreign tribunal of the United States judicial assistance
could not be evaluated because an actual proceeding had not been
commenced. The magistrate court recommended the district court
should, therefore, use its discretionary powers to deny the application as
a whole.18
The district court adopted the recommendation in part and denied the
recommendation in part, finding ultimately that Valle del Cauca and
Cundinamarca met the statutory requirements and the discretionary
factors weighed in favor of granting the application to those Departments
only.19 The district court disagreed with the magistrate's report that the
factor of receptivity could not be evaluated. 20 With a lack of controlling
precedent, the parties argued over which side had the burden of proof in
establishing the foreign tribunal's receptivity. 21
The district court concluded that both sides would bear the burden of
proof because of the nature of the discretionary factors. 22 The district
court also disagreed with the recommendation that the statute's goals
would be circumvented if two of the four Departments were granted the
application, if those two Departments satisfied the statutory

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

In re Dep'ts of Antioquia, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179442, at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *8–9.
Id.
Id. at *16–17.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
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requirements and discretionary factors.23 Ultimately, the district court
granted the application for discovery with respect to Valle del Cauca and
Cundinamarca and denied the application for Caldas and Antioquia. 24
The liquor companies appealed.25
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two issues of first
impression and affirmed all other issues.26 The issues of first impression
concerned, (1) who bears the burden of proof in regard to the receptivity
factor, and (2) whether the application could, in fact, be granted in part
or if unitary disposition was required.27
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
of both parties bearing the burden of proof in regard to the receptivity
factor and affirmed granting the application in part for only the two
Departments that satisfied the statutory and discretionary factors. 28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For around 150 years, the statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 has provided an
avenue for seeking United States judicial assistance in obtaining
domestic discovery in foreign proceedings. 29 In order to grant a Section
1782 application for judicial assistance with discovery, four statutory
requirements must be met; if all of the factors are met the court may
grant the application.30 However, the statutory requirements are not
conclusive because the court also considers four discretionary factors. 31
Even if all statutory requirements are met, the court may deny the
application in light of the weight of the discretionary factors.32
The statute's purpose is in the "twin aims of providing efficient
assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging
foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our

23. Id. at *12.
24. Id. at *17.
25. Dep't of Caldas, 925 F.3d at 1219.
26. Id. at 1221.
27. Id. at 1222, 1224. Section 1782 applications are typically reviewed using an abuse
of discretion standard, with the underlying facts reviewed for clear error. However, the
issue of who bears the burden of proof for a federal statute involves legal questions of
statutory interpretation and is therefore subject to de novo review. Id. at 1221.
28. Id. at 1223–24.
29. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 247.
30. Dep't of Caldas, 925 F.3d at 1221.
31. Id.
32. Id.

[8] ELEVENTH CIRCUITS RENDEZVOUS SECTION 1782 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/21/2020 2:45 PM

SECTION 1782

883

courts."33 Congress specifically gave the district courts the broad power
to respond to international requests for assistance. 34
Parallel to a Section 1782 application is the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, also known as the
Hague Evidence Convention.35 The Hague Evidence Convention is a
treaty signed in 1970 involving sixty-two countries in which the countries
all agreed to provide evidence if needed for judicial proceedings. 36
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is essentially the United States' own codified
version of the treaty and specifically deals only with other countries
requesting evidence from the United States. 37
The interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 gave rise to four requirements
that the party seeking discovery must meet in order for a district court
to exercise its discretion in granting a Section 1782 application:
(1) the request must be made "by a foreign or international tribunal,"
or by "any interested person"; (2) the request must seek evidence,
whether it be the "testimony or statement" of a person or the
production of "a document or other thing"; (3) the evidence must be "for
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal"; and (4) the
person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the
district of the district court ruling on the application for assistance.38

Then, in 2004, with the prominent case of Intel, the Supreme Court
emphasized that just because a district court may grant a Section 1782
application if the statutory requirements are met, it is not required to do
so.39 The district courts should, however, exercise their discretion with
the twin aims of the statute in mind. 40 With this decision, the Supreme
Court solidified four additional discretionary factors that should always
be given consideration when ruling on a Section 1782 discovery
application:

33. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331.
35. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, art.
1., March 18, 1970 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781) ("In civil or commercial matters a judicial
authority of a Contracting State may . . . request the competent authority of another
Contracting State, by means of a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to perform some
other judicial act.").
36. Id.; Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial
Matters,
HCCH
(October
18,
2019,
12:40
PM),
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=82
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
38. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331–32.
39. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264.
40. In re Schlich, 893 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2018).
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(1) whether "the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant
in the foreign proceeding," because "the need for § 1782(a) aid
generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought
from a nonparticipant"; (2) "the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of
the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S.
federal-court judicial assistance"; (3) "whether the § 1782(a) request
conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions
or other policies of a foreign country or the United States"; and (4)
whether the request is otherwise "unduly intrusive or burdensome."41

The factors are analyzed and weighed against each party to decide
whether to grant the application. The first factor—whether the discovery
is sought from a participant in the litigation—arises particularly in
situations in which the foreign court does not have jurisdiction over the
non-party participant and therefore cannot order them to produce
evidence.42 Consequently, without the use of a Section 1782 application,
the evidence could be unobtainable.43
The next factor concerns the "nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings . . . and the receptivity of the foreign
government."44 This factor concerns the utility of the discovery materials
and whether the foreign court will accept the evidence.45 In addition, this
factor looks to the reciprocity of the country, in other words, whether the
foreign country would provide the United States assistance if the roles
were reversed.46
The factor regarding whether the request circumvents the discovery
restrictions of the foreign tribunal is interesting. There is no rule that
litigants have to try to obtain the discovery through the foreign court
before filing a Section 1782 request, nevertheless, this is still a factor that
the district courts consider when deciding whether to grant an
application.47
The Discovery Scope and Limits set forth by Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure48 are used for the factor of whether the request
41. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Intel Corp, 542 U.S at 264–65).
42. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264 (2004).
43. Id. at 264.
44. Id. at 264.
45. In re Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
46. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 1998).
47. In re Caratube Int'l Oil Co., LLP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2010).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(c)(i) ("[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery . . . if it determines that: the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive.").
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is "overbroad or unduly burdensome."49 It is not assessed on whether the
discovery would be available in the foreign jurisdiction. The courts have
noted that "[f]ew if any foreign jurisdictions permit the scope of discovery
available in our courts."50 A Section 1782 application would become
meaningless if it was only ever granted if the discovery would have been
permitted in that foreign jurisdiction. 51 In addition, if the court does find
that discovery would be unduly intrusive or burdensome, the discovery
request could be trimmed and granted only to discovery which would not
be unduly intrusive or burdensome.52
The statute becomes tricky in situations where the United States does
not have good relations with a country, including circumstances in which
the United States does not recognize certain countries' governments at
all. In response to these issues, in 1964 Congress stated, "if 'relations
with a country [are] so strained as to make the rendering of judicial
assistance under this section improper' the federal court should 'use its
discretion to deny a request for assistance although the United States
and that country are technically at peace.'"53 Similarly, the Trading with
the Enemy Act54 severs all legal communication with any countries with
whom the United States has declared war. 55
While the Intel factors seemed to provide more concrete guidance for
the district courts to determine whether to grant or deny applications
under Section 1782, there were still questions to be formally answered
by the courts such as the "minimum requirements or tests to be met" in
regard to the factors.56

49. Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 2015).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International
Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 606 (1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88–1580, 2d Sess., at 8
(1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3789).
54. 50 U.S.C.A. § 4303 (2019).
55. Id. § 4303 (c) provides:
It shall be unlawful . . . . For any person . . . to send, or take out of, or bring
into . . . the United States, any letter or other writing or tangible form of
communication . . . and it shall be unlawful for any person to send, take, or
transmit . . . out of the United States, any letter . . . or other form of
communication intended for or to be delivered, directly or indirectly, to an enemy
or ally of enemy.
56. Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. Vehicles v. KPMG, L.L.P., 798 F.3d 113, 118
(2d Cir. 2015).
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A. Who Bears the Burden?
Who bears the burden of proving the discretionary factors have been
met, or not, is one of these questions. A split—developing even before
Intel, but solidifying strongly thereafter—emerged throughout the
circuits.
1. Granted Unless Opposition Proves Otherwise?
Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Third,
and Seventh Circuits have analyzed Section 1782 and held that the
application should be granted unless the opposing party to the
application carries their burden of proving that the discretionary factors
weigh against the granting of the application. 57
The Second Circuit described the issue by stating unless the opposing
party was able to offer "authoritative proof" that the foreign court would
be unreceptive to the evidence then the district court should grant the
application.58
The Third Circuit analyzed Section 1782 using legislative history,
specifically the Senate Report59 which instructed courts to use the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where a foreign court is silent on the
proper procedures.60 The Third Circuit stated that Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are known to be extremely liberal and therefore discovery
request applications pursuant to Section 1782 should be granted liberally
unless the opposing party proves actual facts sufficient to warrant its
denial.61 Then, in 2011, in light of the Intel decision, but relying heavily
on Bayer,62 the Third Circuit again concluded that the opposing party is
the one who carries the burden.63
The Seventh Circuit decided Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc. 64
in 2011 and also came to the conclusion that the opposing litigant must
be the one to prove "by more than angry rhetoric" that the discretionary
factors would go against the statute's objectives. 65

57. See, e.g., In re Application for an Order Permitting Metallgesellschaft AG to take
Discovery, 121 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1997); Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 190
(3d Cir. 1999); In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 196; In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 162 (3d
Cir. 2011); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 2011).
58. In re Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d at 80 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. S. REP. NO. 88–1580, at 9, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3789.
60. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 193.
61. Id. at 193, 196.
62. Bayer AG, 173 F.3d 188.
63. In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 162.
64. 633 F.3d 591.
65. Id. at 597.
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2. Equal Burdens?
Contrasting these circuits is the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, which has held that the burden should not solely be
placed on the opposing party, but instead should be equally placed on
both parties.66 The First Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court in
Intel emphasized the district court's "flexibility and discretion" in
balancing the factors and therefore the intent was not to place the burden
on either party.67 The First Circuit decided that the district courts should
be able to look at all the evidence presented by both sides in order to
properly analyze the factors.68
The First Circuit responded to the Second and Third Circuit's
reasoning for the burden falling on the opposing party with the fact that
it did not believe that it was necessary in order to keep track of legislative
intent.69 The First Circuit held that district courts may deny the
application in consideration of the discretionary factors regardless of
whether or not the opposing party has offered reasoning to that effect; so,
ultimately the First Circuit concluded that it was not so much that both
sides should bear the burden, but instead that the opposing party should
not bear the burden.70
3. Burden on Applicant?
Almost no precedent exists for federal cases that have pointed to
placing the burden on the party seeking the discovery with the Section
1782 application. In 2013, in In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust
Litigation,71 a case from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, the issue was slightly danced around. In
a recommendation and report, the receptivity factor was found not to
have been met when the burden was argued to have been incorrectly
placed on the party requesting the application.72 The court concluded
that because all facts were considered, the issue of the burden of proof
was irrelevant to the decision of the case.73However, there was no precise
legal standard binding on this district court on who bore the burden of
proof. The court stated that who bore the burden was anything but

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

In re Schlich, 893 F.3d at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50–51.
Id.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8255, *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013).
Id. at *62–63.
Id.
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"clear."74 Therefore, although the district court ultimately adopted the
report and recommendation, the court did not ratify the theory of placing
the burden on the requesting party.75
B. Grant for One, Grant for All?
Other issues, such as the partial granting of a Section 1782, have never
even found their way directly to the court's attention, until 2019.
Although the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts did touch on the issue, it was seemingly glossed over
without any objection or appeal from any of the parties. 76 The district
court there analyzed the applicants meeting the requirements and
factors separately and granted a partial application in regard to one
applicant and not the other.77 It is important to note that the applications
were filed individually in this instance. 78
With no clear precedent to follow on whether a partial application may
be granted, the Eleven Circuit resolved the question as almost completely
an issue of first impression for all eleven circuits.
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
Here, the liquor companies appealed on the argument that (1) the
burden should be placed on Departments as the parties seeking the
discovery, and (2) the district court should not have granted a partial
application when the Departments filed a joint application. 79
The Eleventh Circuit addressed these Section 1782 issues of first
impression with the statute's purpose at the forefront of its
consideration.80 The court was only faced with the discretionary factor of
receptivity as it relates to the burden of proof and therefore, the court
only ultimately analyzed and decided the burden framework for this one
factor alone. While the court had ample nonbinding precedent from other
circuit's opinions on the issue of who bears the burden of proof, it was left
completely to its own judgment on the granting of a partial application.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (D. Mass. 2010).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Dep't of Caldas, 925 F.3d at 1222, 1224.
Id.
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A. Burden Framework: A "Middle of the Road" Approach
In deciding who bears the burden of proof in a Section 1782
application, the court analyzed the three main approaches other courts
have taken.
The idea of placing the burden of receptively on the applicant, in this
case, the Departments, was a nonstarter for the court. Referencing the
unreported, nonbinding district court case of In re Cathode Ray Tube
Antitrust Litigation, the Eleventh Circuit held that although the burden,
in that case, was technically placed on the applicant, the district court
still looked at all the evidence and the district court chose not to ratify
the part of the report and recommendations of the applicant having the
burden.81 The Eleventh Circuit held that there is essentially no legal
precedent for placing the burden of proof on the Departments and moves
its analysis onto the other approaches. 82
The second approach of placing the burden on the opposing party of
the application was also not appealing to the court. The court analyzes
several cases from the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits that have
held the objecting party must prove the foreign court would be
unreceptive to the evidence obtained in order for the application to not
be granted for the requesting party.83
The Eleventh Circuit understood how the reasoning by these circuits
is consistent with Congress's intent of "providing equitable and
efficacious discovery procedures" and the way they have chosen to do this
is treat information as discoverable unless the opposing party can give
sufficient reasoning as to why it should not be discoverable. 84 While the
court understood why the circuits chose to place the burden on the
opposing party, it ultimately decided the burden would be too much for
one party to bear.85
The court held that requiring one side to provide proof of a foreign
court's lack of receptivity—proving a negative—would not help further
the purpose of the discretionary factors, much less the goals of the
statute.86 The purpose of the statute is for the district court to weigh all
the factors when coming to a decision on a Section 1782 application.87

81. Id. at 1222. (citing In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8255, at *63).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1222–23.
84. Id. at 1222 (quoting In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 195).
85. Id. at 1223.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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In addition, the Eleventh Circuit stated that some respondents do not
have the "wherewithal" to give adequate proof of a foreign court's lack of
receptivity.88 The court realized that the burden is "daunting" to many
parties who will have to respond to these requests and there is no reason
to place it on one party alone.89
The court decided on the First Circuit's approach of not placing a
burden on either party.90 Instead, the court decided that both parties
need to give evidence to the discretionary factors because the court needs
to see all the evidence in order to adequately decide whether to grant the
application.91 The court held that applying a strict burden-shifting
framework is not needed and unhelpful.92 Instead, this "middle of the
road approach will further the goals of the statute."93
The court confidently addressed the liquor companies' argument that
the effect of the burden being placed on all the parties will be that neither
party will address the issue.94 The first rebuttal to this argument was
that because Intel enumerated this factor as one that the district courts
must address, then the district courts will have to address this factor one
way or another before coming to a decision.95 Secondly, the court stated
that applicants sometimes have information that respondents do not and
the court should be privy to that information if available. 96 In addition,
the court stated that it is in the applicant's best interest to give evidence
of receptivity because if they do not, they obviously run the risk of losing
on the factor.97 For the third factor about receptivity, the court extended
its "use it or lose it" reasoning.98 If a party does not provide evidence on
the receptivity factor, the party risks having that factor weighed against
it.99
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately decided the point of the discretionary
factors was for the district court to consider all the evidence and come to
a knowledgeable decision on the application for discovery, and in order
to do this, both sides should have to give evidence of a foreign court's
88. Id. (quoting In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 252).
89. Id. (quoting In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 252) (noting that the liquor
companies could have carried the burden adequately in this specific case).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1223–24.
99. Id.
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receptivity.100 The court decided that not placing the burden on one side
or the other furthers the statute's twin aims of "providing efficient
assistance . . . and encouraging foreign countries by example."101
B. Formalism: A Non-Issue
In deciding whether it was appropriate to grant a partial application
when the Departments filed jointly, the court decided to look at the issue
efficiently.102 The liquor companies argued that granting the application
to only two of the Departments, Vale del Cauca and Cundinamarca, is
inappropriate because the applications of all four Departments were filed
jointly.103 The district court granted the applications of Vale del Cauca
and Cundinamarca because those Departments satisfied the statutory
requirements as well as the discretionary factors. 104
The liquor companies argued that granting it in part is essentially
granting it in whole because the discovery will be shared among the
Departments, even the ones who did not satisfy the factors. 105 In
response, the Eleventh Circuit held that although the liquor companies
present a "practical point" it is not a "legal one." 106
The court discussed that if the entire application was denied purely on
the basis of it being a joint application, then the Departments would turn
around and file separately.107 Once the Departments filed separately, the
applications would be granted for Vale del Cauca and Cundinamarca and
those Departments would unquestionably share the information with
Antioquia and Caldas.108 The end result would be exactly the same. 109
100. Id. at 1223.
101. Id. at 1224 (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 252).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.; Reply Brief of Intervenors–Appellants Liquor Companies at 15, Dept of Caldas,
925 F.3d 1218 (No. 17-15267), 2018 WL 1511489, at *15 (The liquor companies argued that
Section 1782 should only provide assistance to "participants" in foreign litigation, and the
companies stressed that the Departments are expanding the policy "boundlessly" by
providing discovery to "non-participants," in this case the ineligible Departments. The
liquor companies stated that the "Court should fence off these efforts, apply a reasonable
limiting principle to § 1782 applications, and refuse to permit this hijacking of the statute
by the ineligible Departments.").
106. Dep't of Caldas, 925 F.3d at 1224.
107. Id.
108. Id.; Reply Brief of Intervenors–Appellants Liquor Companies at 12–13, Dep't of
Caldas, 925 F.3d 1218 (No. 17-15267), 2018 WL 1511489, at *12–13 (arguing that the
granting of the application to the two Departments will grant them to all of the
Departments which "renders § 1782 a dead letter").
109. Dep't of Caldas, 925 F.3d at 1224.
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The court expressly stated that it refused to "order a course of action
that would lead to an identical result through far less efficient means."110
The court discussed that Congress never has emphasized any concern
with what is done with the discovery after it is acquired from a Section
1782 application.111 In addition, the court stated that denying the
application in whole for "formalistic" reasons would not coincide with the
twin aims of providing efficient assistance to foreign litigation and
leading foreign nations by example.112
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the applications of
Cundinamarca and Valle del Cauca.113
V. IMPLICATIONS
On its face, the Eleventh Circuit's decision will provide a basis for
courts to follow for the burden of proof of the receptivity factor and the
go-ahead to grant a partial Section 1782 application even when filed
jointly. Even more so, the decision will be used as a basis of the burden
of proof for all of the discretionary factors. Without a doubt, other cases
will arise in the Eleventh Circuit in which the burden of proof of the other
discretionary factors is questioned, and this case will serve as strong
persuasive authority.
This decision also has a rather significant effect on trial judges and
litigants. All Eleventh Circuit trial judges will be able to come to fair
decisions across the board by knowing exactly what is expected to be
brought forth by both parties. Likewise, litigants will be able to more
adequately prepare for trial by knowing that both sides are required to
bring forth evidence for their case.
What is interesting to note about this case is that some courts have
criticized the reciprocity factor in general and have deemed it not critical
in the discretionary factor analysis. 114 The argument is that the "liberal
intent to provide judicial assistance whether or not reciprocity exists has
been acknowledged as a primary statutory goal since section 1782's
inception."115
Indeed, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure has written

110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Glock v. Glock, Inc., 797 F.3d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 2015)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1985); In re
Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 192.
115. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 192 (quoting John Deere Ltd., 754 F.2d at 135).
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that the sponsors of the legislation hoped that the provisions for formal
judicial assistance not only would enable full assistance to be made
available, but also would furnish an “. . . example of unilateral,
nonreciprocal, internal legislation, . . . which other countries may wish
to follow.”116

The argument being that a Section 1782 request is unilateral by
nature, the point of its existence is to offer assistance to foreign courts
and to lead by example.117 This could potentially be an underlying reason
that the Eleventh Circuit decided to make specifically the reciprocity
factor a burden that both parties must bear, and may have no indication
for the other discretionary factors. So, while this case could be
interpreted as potential precedent for the burden of proof for the other
discretionary factors, it could also be argued in subsequent cases that the
holding is not relevant to the other discretionary factors.
More importantly, with this case, the Eleventh Circuit decided to take
a balanced and common-sense approach to the issues instead of a rigid
and formalistic approach. With purposivism at the forefront of its
decision, the court also suggests an overarching trend toward a balanced,
reasonable, efficient, and outcome-determinative approach when
deciding issues. It will be interesting to see how the modern and
controversial cases surely to be thrown on the dockets of the Eleventh
Circuit will potentially be decided using this approach. With the 2020
presidential election just around the corner, foreign relations will
continue to change. In the midst of these changes and even if never given
recognition for its importance, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 will continue to be an
integral part of foreign litigation.

Emory Larkin

116. John Deere Ltd., 754 F.2d at 135 (quoting Amram, Public Law No. 88–619 of
October 3, 1964-New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States
of America, 32 D.C. BAR J. 24, 33 (1965) (emphasis omitted)).
117. Id.
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